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Covering up a flawed reality with an exemplary narrative: 
Prior to the revolution of 2011, the story that was being told about Tunisia was quite idealistic. Tunisia was 
the exception to the rule, the example to be followed by neighbors in the region if they had wanted to attain 
the glow of modernity and to bask in the glory of a well-deserved socio-economic growth. Tunisians were 
portrayed, both inside and outside of the country, as educated and liberated. They had access to free 
education and civil liberties. There were no civil wars. If there was poverty, they need not worry at the time 
for there was the Tunisian National Solidarity Fund to balance inequalities and bring electricity and water 
to the ‘shadow regions’.  
The old regime made sure the story being told about Tunisia would sell, and nothing sells better than nicely 
presented, well-crafted lies. By 2011, there was a collective realization that a dissonance existed between 
the story and the reality. The reality was that freedom was only a façade, that prisoners were subject to 
unlawful treatment, that poverty went beyond the so-called ‘shadow regions’ and that unemployment and 
injustice drove hardworking Tunisians to set themselves aflame. What followed this realization was chaos, 
the kind of chaos that was primarily about storytelling and narratives, protagonists and plots. Tunisians lost 
trust in the narratives that were presented to them before 2011, would have to build faith in new ones, lose 
faith in others and navigate the aftermath of political and social changes. 
During the rule of Ben Ali, religion, Islam in particular, was dealt with punitive caution. People who regularly 
prayed at the mosque were under house arrest, having to sign an agreement on a daily basis in police 
stations, females were prohibited from wearing the headscarf in public or they faced persecution, mosques 
were under monitoring with imams obliged to demonstrate alliance to the former president.  Religion was 
deployed by Ben Ali’s regime in the way that it deemed right or moderate enough. This meant that while 
Ramadhan, Eids and any other religious occasions were officially celebrated in Tunisia, showing more than 
necessary commitment to religion was frowned upon. This also meant that religious education fell into a 
grey area, where the only version approved was the one written in the books at school or expressed within 
the speech of the Imam at the mosque. Attempting to go beyond the state’s definition of Islam would mean 
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Disillusionment: confronting reality with a conflicting narrative 
When the revolution occurred, the story no longer made sense and the heroes were no longer heroes. The 
narrative of the staggeringly developed and perfectly moderate Arab Muslim country that stood tall and 
proud among its neighboring countries was not one any Tunisian could believe anymore. Soon, narratives 
that were previously concealed would emerge. While people celebrated their new-found ability to express 
their ideas unhindered, religious groups had the opportunity to assemble and to preach their ideology as 
they never had before. Violent extremist narratives came first by filling the gap left by the fracturing of the 
Tunisian ideal. Online, extremist messages gained traction. Thousands of Tunisian youth could not settle 
for rebuilding their own state; instead, they found meaning in an even more idealistic vision – the creation 
of a utopian Caliphate. Eight years after the revolution, thousands of Tunisians have joined the jihad in Syria 
and tens of thousands have attempted to do so. 
 The reality today is far closer to the deterioration of pre-2011 than what Tunisians dreamed on the onset 
of the revolution. Economic deterioration, insecurity, corruption, and unemployment persist at 
increasingly high rates. Narratives of stagnation have encouraged hundreds to leave the country and left 
those who remain feeling powerless and lost. This is fertile ground for a resurgence of violent extremist 
ideology. 
 
Moving from counter narratives toward alternative narratives: 
Simply countering the ideology does not work. Civil society and public authorities in Tunisia have 
attempted to react by deconstructing and demystifying violent extremist narratives while publicly 
denouncing groups such as the Islamic State or Ansar al-Sharia. They call their ideology a ‘perversion’ of 
Islam. Yet this is not sufficient. A strategy built around creating a counter-narrative relies primarily on 
trying to keep up with ever increasing anti-social beliefs while they proliferate among communities and 
individuals. A counter-narrative with its reactionary nature may fail to keep up with the fast-paced 
alterations and evolution of a violent extremist ideology. By the time the counter-narrative reaches its 
target audience, its story is likely irrelevant and possibly even counter-productive. 
Perhaps, the trouble has always been this: Tunisians have not had the opportunity to write or tell their own 
stories. Perhaps, the problem was that of narratives. The old regime provided false narratives of 
exaggerated prosperity and progress. Extremist groups provided and continue to provide a violence-
inciting narrative that fills the void of a history of religious frustration and illiteracy. 
A single counter-narrative cannot respond to the issues and to the grievances of all people and of all the 
population that violent extremist groups exploit. The narratives forming and emerging are multiple, 
multilayered and complex. Thus, there needs to be a new story that equips people with hope while also 
giving them the tools to strive for a decent life in their country, a story where there is palpable proof that 
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change can occur through peaceful means. Tunisia needs an alternative narrative, one that acknowledges 
the country’s fragile position but inspires Tunisians to return to the country and work towards shared 
prosperity and justice, regardless of the region. A government-led platform has been in the works since 
2016 under the supervision of the Ministry of in charge of relations with constitutional bodies, civil society 
and human rights. The platform aims to prevent violent extremist behavior through a grassroots approach. 
Its messaging techniques were based on wide swathes of Tunisian community and carefully tuned to each 
neighborhood, so as “to have a certain feeling of appropriation since the process engages various actors 
such as local actors and young people,” explains Mr. Moez Ali, President of the Union of Independent 
Tunisians for Liberty (UTIL), which is working on a project that will be featured on the platform. Only now 
concluding its research phase, the platform will soon launch and include a mapping of projects that tackle 
violent extremism in Tunisia, an online accredited counseling service for Imams, and a media stage that will 
feature all content produced so far to counter violent extremism. 
Tunisia needs a new story, where trust is built among Tunisians both between cities and classes. This 
narrative must bridge the gap the old regime left and far exceed the expectations that post-revolutionary 
governments have failed to meet. Both before and after the revolution, the reality of things and the 
narrative provided by the state did not mirror each other, creating frustration and disillusionment among 
young people leaving them prone to exploitation. Tunisians need a narrative that represents them, that 
represents their reality and that is aware of its complexity. 
 
